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Recent evidence from multiple neuroscience techniques indicates that regions within the
anterior temporal lobes (ATLs) are a critical node in the neural network for representing
conceptual knowledge, yet their function remains elusive. The hub-and-spoke model holds
that ATL regions act as a transmodal conceptual hub, distilling the various sensory-motor
features of objects and words into integrated, coherent conceptual representations. Single-
cell recordings in monkeys suggest that the ATLs are critically involved in visual associa-
tive learning; however, investigations of this region in humans have focused on existing
knowledge rather than learning. We studied acquisition of new concepts in semantic de-
mentia patients, who have cortical damage centred on the ventrolateral aspects of the
ATLs. Patients learned to assign abstract visual stimuli to two categories. The categories
conformed to a family resemblance structure in which no individual stimulus features
were fully diagnostic; thus the task required participants to form representations that
integrate multiple features into a single concept. Patients were unable to do this, instead
responding only on the basis of individual features. The study reveals that integrating
disparate sources of information into novel coherent concepts is a critical computational
function of the ATLs. This explains the central role of this region in conceptual repre-
sentation and the catastrophic breakdown of concepts in semantic dementia.
ª 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license. 1. Introduction influential view, originally proposed by Wernicke (Wernicke,Conceptual knowledge for objects comprises a diverse set of
information about their sensory qualities, motor plans and
verbal associations. How are these disparate sources of
information linked to form a concept? According to onechool of Psychological S
er.ac.uk (P. Hoffman).
Elsevier Ltd. Open access und1900; as cited in Eggert, 1977), conceptual knowledge for ob-
jects arises from the co-activation of their sensory-motor
properties within a network of modality-specific processing
regions that are widely distributed throughout the cortex
(Barsalou, 2008; Martin, 2007; Pulvermuller, 2001). Thisciences, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester M13
er CC BY license. 
Fig. 1 e Experimental Stimuli. (A) Stimuli were divided into two categories according to a family resemblance structure. The
top row of the training set comprises exemplars that possessed all three typical features of their respective category. The
remaining exemplars possessed two typical features of the category and one feature associated with the opposing category.
Stimuli in the generalisation set were not presented during training but retained for subsequent test. (B) Perceptual
discrimination test. Each trial comprised three identical pairs of stimuli and a lone one odd-one-out. The three levels of
ambiguity manipulated the number of features the odd-one-out shared with the pairs.
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down of conceptual knowledge under brain damage. First,
damage to a single,modality-specific region should give rise to
knowledge deficits that disproportionately affect properties in
that modality and, by extension, categories of objects for
which the affected modality is particularly central (Capitani,
Laiacona, Mahon, & Caramazza, 2003; Mahon & Caramazza,
2009; Warrington & Shallice, 1984). So, for example, damage
to regions of inferior parietal cortex involved in representing
skilled actions should impair knowledge of how objects are
manipulated and lead to a disproportionate deficit for tools
(Buxbaum & Saffran, 2002). The second prediction concerns
global, pan-modal conceptual impairments. According to
Wernicke and his modern counterparts, these should only
occur as a result of global cortical damage, because only
damage to all of the modality-specific regions would be suf-
ficient to produce a global impairment. This prediction is
challenged by the neurodegenerative syndrome of semantic
dementia (SD). SD patients suffer from a global conceptual
knowledge deficit that affects all categories of object andword
(Hoffman & Lambon Ralph, 2011; Lambon Ralph, Lowe, &
Rogers, 2007) and all sensory-motor modalities (Bozeat,
Lambon Ralph, Patterson, Garrard, & Hodges, 2000; Bozeat,
Lambon Ralph, Patterson, & Hodges, 2002; Luzzi et al., 2007;
Piwnica-Worms, Omar, Hailstone, & Warren, 2010), yet the
cerebral atrophy and hypometabolism that gives rise to this
debilitating impairment is not global: it is focused bilaterally
on the anterior ventrolateral and polar portions of the tem-
poral lobes (Galton et al., 2001; Mion et al., 2010). Evidence
from functional neuroimaging (Binney, Embleton, Jefferies,Parker, & Lambon Ralph, 2010; Visser & Lambon Ralph, 2011)
and transcranial magnetic stimulation (Pobric, Jefferies, &
Lambon Ralph, 2007; Pobric, Jefferies, & Lambon Ralph, 2010)
in neurologically-intact participants confirms that ventrolat-
eral anterior temporal lobe (ATL) areas are involved in all
forms of conceptual processing irrespective of themodality of
the information or the category of object probed. The crucial
role of this area in transmodal semantic representation also
fits with recent in vivo tractography data demonstrating the
convergence of multiple white-matter pathways into the ATL.
Such results indicate that this region’s structural connectivity
is ideal for blending different sources of verbal and nonverbal
information into integrated, coherent concepts (Binney,
Parker, & Lambon Ralph, 2012).
To account for the global, pan-modal involvement of the
ventrolateral ATLs in conceptual knowledge, we have devel-
oped an alternative framework for conceptual knowledge
termed the “hub-and-spoke” model (Lambon Ralph, Sage,
Jones, & Mayberry, 2010; Patterson, Nestor, & Rogers, 2007;
Pobric et al., 2010; Rogers et al., 2004). This model holds that
in addition to modality-specific sources of information
(“spokes”) and their inter-connections, representation of
conceptual knowledge requires an integrative “hub”. The hub
uses information from the modality-specific spoke regions to
develop modality-invariant, conceptual representations that
capture deeper patterns of conceptual similarity across all
sensory-motor and verbal modalities. These integrated rep-
resentations are necessary because similarity in any particular
sensory-motor domain is, at best, only a partial guide to con-
ceptual similarity (Dilkina & Lambon Ralph, 2013; Lambon
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apples and bananas have different shapes, colours and tactile
properties and are manipulated in different ways, the con-
ceptual systemmust be able to recognise that they are similar
types of object. In addition, true conceptual representation
requires the integration of properties that are experienced in
different times and situations, and representation of the
complex, non-linear relationships between the concept’s
verbal and nonverbal modality-specific properties and its
conceptual significance (see Lambon Ralph et al., 2010 for
more detailed discussion of these issues). The hub-and-spoke
framework holds that the ATL hub provides this critical aspect
of conceptual representation through the formation of repre-
sentations that integrate information from all sensory-motor-
verbal domains. When this region is damaged, as in SD, the
result is a breakdown in the complex boundaries that define
different concepts, such that semantic decisions come to be
made on the basis of superficial characteristics rather than
their deeper conceptual properties. For example, SD patients
may reject “emu” as an example of a bird but simultaneously
over-extend the concept to accept “butterfly” (Lambon Ralph
et al., 2010; Mayberry, Sage, & Lambon Ralph, 2011).
Previous work on the function of the ventrolateral ATLs
has focused on their role in representing existing knowledge
and its progressive deterioration as a result of ATL atrophy in
SD (e.g., Binney et al., 2010; Rogers et al., 2004). The hub-and-
spoke framework also predicts that the ATLs play a key role in
the acquisition of novel concepts (Rogers & McClelland, 2004).
There is already some support for this idea from electro-
physiological studies in primates. The response properties of
anterior inferior temporal neurons change as monkeys learn
novel associations between visual stimuli, suggesting a role
for this region in the acquisition of concepts (Albright, 2012).
In the present study, we tested this hypothesis in humans by
studying acquisition of new conceptual knowledge in patients
with SD. The hub-and-spoke model predicts that the ATLs are
critical for integrating the various sensory features of an ob-
ject into a unified, coherent conceptual representation that
can be generalised to new exemplars. We tested this predic-
tion by training SD patients to recognise novel visual stimuli
as members of two categories. Previous research has shown
that SD patients are able to apply well-defined rules to classify
novel stimuli, when the classification rule is provided by the
experimenter (Koenig, Smith, & Grossman, 2006). Here, we
tested the patients’ ability to acquire more complex category
structures that could not be captured by a simple rule and
when no information about the nature of the categories was
supplied by the experimenter.
The structure of the two categories (shown in Fig. 1A) was
designed such that optimal performance could only be ach-
ieved by acquiring integrated representations of the various
typical characteristics of each category. When presented en
masse as in Fig. 1, it is easy to discern the features associated
with each category. Members of Category A usually contained
squares while those in B contained circles, though there were
exceptions in both categories. The same was true for the
number of shapes (members of A usually contain one shape)
and the colour of the background square (usually blue for A).
The colour of the internal shapes, though perceptually salient,
was not diagnostic of category. This category structure, inwhich a number of features are associated with each category
but no single feature is diagnostic, is termed a family resem-
blance structure and is characteristic of object categories in
the real world (Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Smith & Medin, 1981;
Wittgenstein, 1953). Within such a structure, it is impossible
to classify with complete accuracy by learning only about a
single feature dimension. Optimum performance instead re-
quires participants to form integrated representations that
include second-order statistical information about the feature
conjunctions that characterise each category, allowing them,
for example, to correctly class an exemplar with two circles as
a member of Category B, even if it has a blue background. We
predicted that forming such integrated representations is a
key function of the ATLs and, therefore, that SD patients
would be impaired in learning the categories.
We deliberately selected an abstract, novel set of stimuli
with little perceptual similarity to objects in the real word, to
ensure that pre-existing conceptual knowledge would not
influence the learning process. However, the novel stimuli’s
underlying family resemblance structure meant that they
shared several important attributes with real conceptual
categories.
1. Items in a category shared a number of typical character-
istics but no single feature was diagnostic of category
membership (e.g., most creatures that fly are birds but
there are also a number of flightless birds and some non-
bird creatures that can fly).
2. While there were no individual diagnostic features, the
conjunction of a number of typical features was a good
guide to category membership (e.g., a creature that lays
eggs and has feathers and a beak is likely to be a bird, even if
it cannot fly).
3. Some features, though salient, were not useful in deter-
mining category membership (e.g., the colour of a creature
is not helpful in deciding whether it is a bird or not).
Our hypothesis was that the computational challenges
posed by these complex, natural categories are met by the
ATLs, which form integrated conceptual representations that
allow us to categorise items based on the overall summation
of their characteristics rather than relying on a single defining
feature. We predicted that SD patients would be impaired in
their ability to acquire these integrated representations,
leading to an over-reliance on individual features to guide
their category decisions.2. Method
2.1. Patients and background testing
Seven patients with SDwere recruited frommemory clinics in
northwest and southwest England. All met published diag-
nostic criteria for SD (Gorno-Tempini et al., 2011; Hodges,
Patterson, Oxbury, & Funnell, 1992), in that they presented
with pan-modal conceptual knowledge deficit that affected
receptive and expressive tasks. Other aspects of cognition
were preserved in all but the most severe cases: patients were
well-oriented in time and space and presented with fluent,
Fig. 2 e Structural imaging. Structural MR or CT images for patients, indicating anterior temporal atrophy in each case. No
images were available for P.W., though an MR scan report confirmed that this patient also had anterior temporal damage.
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Table 1 e Demographic information and background neuropsychology.
Test Max J.W. M.T. M.B. P.L. P.W. N.H. E.T. Control mean (range)
Sex F F F F M F F
Age 63 61 61 73 73 69 80
School-leaving age 16 16 15 15 17 16 14
Cambridge Semantic Battery
Picture naming 64 43 44 32 22 8 11 0 62.3 (57e64)
Wordepicture matching (chance level ¼ 6/64) 64 61 50 48 43 33 19 14 63.8 (63e64)
Semantic association (CCT) 64 49 37 30 30 34 24 NT 59.1 (51e62)
Category fluency (six categories) e 53 50 37 26 22 14 8 95.7 (61e134)
General neuropsychology
ACE-R 100 62 67 67 56 41 29 43 93.7 (85e100)
MMSE 30 29 27 27 23 23 17 21
Visuospatial
Rey figure copy 36 34 36 35 31 34 27.5 29.5 34.0 (31e36)
VOSP number location 10 8 10 10 7 10 10 7 9.4 (7e10)
VOSP cube analysis 10 10 10 10 9 10 8 10 9.7 (6e10)
Attention/Executive
Digit span forward e 6 7 6 8 5 4 7 6.8 (4e8)
Digit span backward e 6 6 4 5 4 4 6 4.8 (3e7)
Raven’s coloured progressive matrices 36 32 34 31 31 34 13 29
ACE-R ¼ Addenbrookes Cognitive Examination e Revised (Mioshi et al., 2006); MMSE ¼ Mini-mental state examination (Folstein et al., 1975);
VOSP ¼ Visual Object and Space Perception battery (Warrington & James, 1991); CCT ¼ Camel and Cactus test (Bozeat et al., 2000).
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intended to span the full range of severity in semantic per-
formance and one of the most severe cases (N.H.), while
initially presentingwith a selective semantic impairment, had
begun to show signs of decline on other cognitive tasks at the
time of the study. Structural neuroimaging indicated bilateral
atrophyof theanterior temporal region in each case (see Fig. 2).
Patients completedabatteryof standardneuropsychological
tests. Conceptual knowledge was assessed using elements of
the Cambridge Semantic Battery (Bozeat et al., 2000), consisting
of tests of picture naming, spoken wordepicture matching,
pictorial semantic association (the Camel and Cactus Test) and
verbal fluency for six semantic categories. All seven patients
performed below the normal range on all tests. As expected,
there was a broad range of impairment in conceptual knowl-
edge frommild to very severe (see Table 1; patients are ordered
from mild to severe based on wordepicture matching scores).
General dementia severity was assessed with the Adden-
brooke’s Cognitive Examination-Revised (Mioshi, Dawson,
Mitchell, Arnold, & Hodges, 2006) and the Mini Mental State
Examination (Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975). Visuospatial
processing was tested using the Rey figure copy and two sub-
tests from the Visual Object and Space Perception battery
(Warrington & James, 1991). Patients also completed tests of
digit span (Wechsler, 1987) and Raven’s coloured progressive
matrices (Raven, 1962). These tests revealed the expected
pattern of relative preservation of other cognitive functions in
most cases. The case-series included two severely impaired
patients:N.H.andE.T.At timeof testing,N.H.hadbeguntoshow
signs of more general cognitive decline. In contrast, E.T. per-
formed strikingly well on the non-semantic tasks, despite se-
vere semantic impairment. We included both patients in the
case-series in order to assess the effects of severe conceptual
knowledge impairment on learning; however, it is possible thatconcomitant deficits may have affected N.H.’s performance.
Importantly, the other six patients all demonstrated preserva-
tionof thebasicperceptual andcognitive functionsnecessary to
complete the category learning task. Raven’s progressive
matrices were particularly informative in this regard. Like the
experimental task described below, it involves abstract col-
oured geometric shapes. It also has a strong problem-solving
element and requires understanding the notion of similarity
relationships between stimuli. All of the patients except N.H.
performed well on this test.
2.2. Experimental stimuli
Twenty-four abstract visual stimuli were created based on
those used by Waldron and Ashby (2001). Stimuli varied on
four dimensions: background colour, internal shape, number
of shapes and shape colour. Background colour, shape and
number were all relevant for categorisation. These di-
mensions each had two possible values (e.g., shape: circle or
square) and we refer to these as “features”. The shape colour
dimension had three possible values (red, black and green)
and was irrelevant for classification. A family resemblance
structure was used to divide the stimuli into two categories,
arbitrarily labelled A and B (see Fig. 1A). Each of the three
relevant dimensions had a feature reliably associated with
each category, though no single dimension was fully diag-
nostic of category. Eighteen exemplars were presented during
the category learning task. Three exemplars in each category
possessed all of the three features associated with the cate-
gory (i.e., the typical background, typical number and typical
shape for their category, shown in the top row of Fig. 1A). The
remaining exemplars had two features that were typical of
their category, while the remaining feature wasmore strongly
associated with the opposing category. Six exemplars were
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to later test the participants’ ability to generalise their
learning to novel exemplars.
2.3. Category learning task
Patients completed a learning task over two sessions on
consecutive days. Each learning session consisted of 144 trials.
At the beginning of the task, patients were told that they
would see some abstract patterns and would attempt to learn
which ones were “A”s and which were “B”s. They were told
that there was no simple rule for deciding but that it was
something they would learn over time. On each trial, they saw
one of the 18 exemplars, presented in the centre of a laptop
computer screen on a white background. The letters A and B
were presented in bottom left and right corners of the screen
and the patientwas askedwhether the exemplarwas anA or a
B. They were then presented with a green tick if they decided
correctly or a red cross if they chose the wrong category.
Verbal feedback was also given at first so that patients un-
derstood the significance of the ticks and crosses. At no point
were participants told which aspects of the stimuli to attend
to or how to make their decisions. The 144 trials were divided
into eight blocks, with each exemplar presented once in each
block. For the second session, the patients were told that they
were continuing the task they started the previous day and
that the identity of the A’s and B’s had not changed.
To determine the degree to which participants were able to
form integrated category representations, categorisation suc-
cess during the second half of the second sessionwas analysed
in detail (72 trials). By this point, participants had completed
216 trials of the learning task, allowing them to form stable
representations of the characteristics of each category.
2.4. Generalisation test
The generalisation test probed participants’ ability to apply
their acquired knowledge of the categories to a new set of
stimuli comprised the same features but in novel combina-
tions. This allowed us to rule out an alternative basis for task
performance: namely, that participants had used an episodic
memory strategy and attempted to memorise the correct
category for each individual stimulus, rather than learning the
underlying properties that characterised the two categories.
We reasoned that knowledge of the underlying category
structure would generalise to a new set of stimuli that par-
ticipants had not seen during learning. In contrast, if partici-
pants had only learned the categories for the specific stimuli
presented during learning, they would not be able to classify
new stimuli at an above-chance level.
To test for generalisation, immediately after the second
session participants were presented with six new exemplars,
not presented during training. They were asked to classify
them as before, though no feedback was given. Each of the six
new exemplars was presented a total of four times.
2.5. Visual discrimination test
In a recent study, Barense, Rogers, Bussey, Saksida, and
Graham (2010) demonstrated that SD patients can havedifficulty discriminating between visual objects when they
have many overlapping features. Specifically, patients were
impaired when required to discriminate stimuli based on
conjunctions of features, even in a purely perceptual task
with no learning requirement. This raises the possibility
that apparent deficits in learning could arise because SD
patients have difficulty perceiving the stimuli correctly. To
ensure that our patients were able to discriminate between
the stimuli in our experiment, we tested them with a
demanding odd-one-out task described by Barense et al.
(2010).
On each trial, patients were presented simultaneously
with seven exemplars from the learning study. The seven
stimuli consisted of three identical pairs and one “odd-one-
out” and patients were asked to point to the odd-one-out.
There were three conditions of increasing difficulty. In the
minimum ambiguity condition, the odd-one-out could be
detected on the basis of a single stimulus dimension (e.g., in
Fig. 1B, it is the only exemplar containing two shapes). In the
medium ambiguity condition, it was necessary to perceive
the conjunction of two dimensions to distinguish the odd-
one-out (e.g., in Fig. 1B, only the odd-one-out has squares
on a yellow background). Finally, in the maximum ambiguity
condition, the odd-one-out could only be detected by inte-
grating all three dimensions. The three conditions were
intermixed and there were 105 trials in total. Patients
completed the discrimination test at least two weeks after
completing the learning task.
2.6. Control participants
Twelve healthy volunteers completed the learning and
generalisation tests. They had a mean age of 69 years and
educational level of 16.7 years, neither of which differed from
the patients [t(17) < 1.9, p > .05]. Six different individuals
completed the visual discrimination test. Their mean age was
68 and education was 16.0 years [not significantly different
from patients: t(11) < 1.0, p > .05].3. Results
Mean categorisation accuracy in the control group was 67%
(standard deviation ¼ 9.7%), which indicates that learning the
family resemblance category structure under experimental
conditions was challenging even for healthy participants, as
expected from previous studies (Medin, Wattenmaker, &
Hampson, 1987). SD patients also averaged 67% (standard
deviation ¼ 4.7%) and their accuracy was not significantly
different to that of controls [t(17) ¼ .15, p ¼ .88]. Importantly,
binomial tests indicated that all seven patients were signifi-
cantly above chance in their categorisation performance
(p < .0019). This indicates that all of the patients understood
the nature of the task (i.e., they were not guessing) and were
able to acquire some information about the novel stimuli. To
determine the nature of the representations formed by our
participants, we analysed performance on the final 72 trials of
the learning task in more detail. These analyses revealed that
learning in the SD group took a very different form to that seen
in the control group, as we describe next.
Fig. 3 e Individual performance profiles. Pattern of responding for all patients and two representative controls. The y-axis
shows the probability of responding “B” to stimuli with each feature. All three dimensions were relevant for classification.
Control 1 displayed an optimum pattern of learning, successfully learning the categoryefeature associations in each
dimension. Control 2 was less successful but still displayed modest learning in all three dimensions. In contrast, patients
were more likely to learn the category structure in only a single dimension. B colour [ background colour.
1 With the exception of P.W., there appears to be a tendency
towards classification based on number rather than the other two
dimensions. It is not clear whether this occurred by chance or if
reflects a consistent tendency for SD patients to focus on quantity
above other perceptual features. There was no such bias towards
number in the control group.
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Our key prediction was that SD patients would have difficulty
forming integrated representations that included information
about all three dimensions needed for optimal classification.
To test this, we investigated how participants classified
stimuli with each type of feature. Fig. 3 shows the data from
each patient and, for comparison purposes, from two repre-
sentative controls. Each participant’s responses have been
split according to the exemplar’s features on each of the three
critical dimensions. The y-axis shows how often the partici-
pant responded B to stimuli with each feature, so values close
to one indicate items that were usually classed as B’s and
values close to zero show items that were usually classed as
A’s. Control 1 showed an optimal pattern of responding: she
successfully acquired knowledge about the typical features in
all three dimensions (this can be seen clearly by comparing
her pattern of responses with the set of category members in
Fig. 1A; for example, she correctly classified most of the circle
exemplars as B’s and the squares as A’s). This control partic-
ipant performed at over 90% accuracy during the final phase oflearning. Control 2 achieved much poorer learning overall
(60% accuracy) but showed a similar qualitative pattern. She
also learned about all three dimensions equally, albeit to a
much lesser extent. The pattern in the patients was rather
different and indicates that theywere unable to form coherent
representations that combined all three dimensions. Four
patients (M.T., M.B., P.L. and P.W.) learned about only one of
the three critical dimensions, as indicated by strong differ-
entiation and one dimension and a lack of discrimination on
the other two dimensions. For example, P.W. classified all
stimuli based on their shape, ignoring their number and
background colour.1 The remaining three patients showed a
more ambiguous pattern of performance, with weak learning
on two stimulus dimensions.
Fig. 4 e Sensitivity to stimulusdimensions. (A) Strength of learning (d0) on eachdimension for eachpatient and the twogroups
(see text for details). The blue line indicates the optimum d0 for all threedimensions. Patients are arranged indescending order
of semantic performance (wordepicture matching). (B) D0 measure for the shape colour dimension, which was irrelevant for
classification. The optimum d0 in this case is zero. * indicates p[ .04; ** indicates p[ .003 andw indicates p[ .07.
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d0 scores for each participant. D0 is a signal detection measure
that reflects a participant’s tendency to give a particular
response when presented with a particular type of stimulus
weighed against their propensity to make the same response
to other stimuli. We computed d0 scores that expressed a
participant’s sensitivity to the featureecategory associations
in each of the three dimensions. According to our predictions,
SD patients should show strong learning (i.e., high d0 values) in
one dimension but much weaker learning across the
remaining dimensions. Controls were expected to display a
more even pattern of learning across the three dimensions.
Once d0 scores had been computed, an additional step was
necessary to compare the results in the two groups. Since
different participants learned about different aspects of the
stimuli (e.g., compare patient M.T. with P.W.), a simple aver-
aging of the d0 scores in each dimension would mask the true
effects. Instead, we labelled the dimensions for each partici-
pant according to their d0 scores, with the dimension in which
the greatest learning had occurred labelled as their strongest
dimension (so M.T.’s strongest dimension was number, her
second dimensionwas shape and her weakest dimensionwas
background colour). We were then able to average d0 scores
within each group based on the strongest, second and weak-
est dimensions of each individual.
D0 scoresare shown for eachpatient inFig. 4A. It is important
to note that interpretation of the d0 scores presented here isslightly different to most circumstances. In most studies, a
particular stimulus feature is always associated with a partic-
ular response and optimum performance is signified by the
maximumpossible d0 value (typically between 3 and 4). Because
of the family resemblance structure employed here, each
feature was only associated with its typical category on 78% of
trials. As a consequence, the optimum d0 score was lower: a
participant classifyingwith 100%accuracywould have d0 scores
of 1.52 for each dimension (indicated by the blue line in Fig. 4A).
Scores higher than this indicate an over-extension of the
learning in the strongest dimension, such that the information
in this dimension was driving classification even for exemplars
where the other two dimensions pointed towards a different
category. This over-generalisation was present in four of the
seven patients and is similar to the over-generalisation exhibi-
ted by SD patients when attempting to use their impaired con-
ceptual knowledge of real objects (see Discussion). No patients
demonstrated much learning in their second or weakest di-
mensions, in linewith the prediction that theywould be unable
to form category representations that integrated all of the in-
formation required for optimum categorisation.
The mean d0 scores in each group can be seen in Fig. 4A. As
expected, there was a large disparity between the strongest
dimension and the remaining two dimensions in SD, with a
more balanced pattern of learning across the three di-
mensions in the control group. A 3 (dimension)  2 (group)
ANOVAwas performed on these data. Therewas amain effect
Fig. 5 e Response accuracy on each test. (A) Accuracy during the final phase of learning, with trials divided according to their
consistency with each participant’s most strongly learned dimension. (B) Accuracy in classifying generalisation stimuli
introduced after the training period, compared with equivalent stimuli in the learning period. (C) Accuracy in perceptual
discrimination at varying levels of complexity.
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group but there was a highly significant interaction between
dimension and group [F(2,34) ¼ 6.83, p ¼ .003]. Post-hoc t-tests
indicated that SD patients showed significantly less learning
on their weakest dimension than controls [t(17) ¼ 3.44,
p ¼ .003]. There was also a trend towards poorer learning on
the second dimension in SD patients, relative to controls
[t(17) ¼ 1.95, p ¼ .07].
While the general pattern in the patient groupwas towards
strong, single-dimension learning, we did observe some
variation across patients, with J.W., N.H. and E.T. displaying a
less clear pattern than the other four patients. To investigate
these differences, we tested whether these patients’ re-
sponses were influenced by the shape colour dimension,
which was irrelevant for classification. We calculated a
d0 measure of “learning” in this dimension in a similarmanner
to the other dimensions. Since this dimension was irrelevant
to classification, the optimum d0 was 0. The results are shown
in Fig. 4B. The four patients who achieved themost successful
learning on their strongest dimension showed low d0 values,
indicating that they were not influenced by the irrelevant
dimension. However, patients N.H. and E.T., and to a lesser
extent J.W., had higher d0 scores, indicating that their re-
sponses were incorrectly influenced by this dimension. This
suggests amore severe impairment in these individuals, since
their responses were guided by stimulus features that were
not reliably associated with either category. In line with this
hypothesis, the two patients with the most severe semantic
deficit showed the largest effects (N.H. and E.T.). D0 scores in
the SD group as a whole were also compared with those of the
control group (see Fig. 4B). As a group, SD patients were more
likely to be influenced by the irrelevant dimension than con-
trols [t(17) ¼ 2.26, p ¼ .04].
3.2. Accuracy on critical “inconsistent” trials
The general picture emerging from the d0 analyseswas that SD
patients displayed relatively successful learning on their
strongest dimension but were less successful in learning the
category associations in the other two dimensions. Thissuggests that they failed to integrate the various stimulus
features into a coherent conceptual representation. As a
strong test of this interpretation, we re-analysed catego-
risation accuracy but now specifically considered trials on
which an over-reliance on learning in one dimension would
cause participants to choose the wrong category. Trials from
the final period of learning were divided into two conditions
for each participant:
1. Consistent trials: On most trials (78%), the feature on the
strongest dimension indicated the correct category for the
exemplar. On these trials, participants could categorise
correctly even if they had only acquired knowledge in a
single dimension.
2. Inconsistent trials: Due to the family resemblance struc-
ture, there were a minority of trials in which the feature in
the participant’s strongest dimension did not indicate the
correct category. Participants could only give the correct
response on these trials if they had also acquired some
knowledge of the other two dimensions, which would
direct them towards the correct response. Consequently,
we expected SD patients to have particular difficulty on
these trials, because it was not possible for them to select
the correct category unless they had achieved integrated
learning across multiple dimensions.
Fig. 5A shows correct responses in each condition, aver-
agedwithin the two groups. The datawere analysedwith 2 2
mixed ANOVA that included condition and group. This
revealed main effects of both group [F(1,17) ¼ 10.7, p ¼ .005]
and condition [F(1,17) ¼ 89, p < .001]. The condition effect in-
dicates that both groups found the inconsistent trials more
difficult. Critically, there was also a highly significant inter-
action [F(1,17) ¼ 10.8, p ¼ .004]. Post-hoc tests indicated that
patients performed as accurately as controls on consistent
trials (t < 1) but were substantially impaired on inconsistent
trials [t(19) ¼ 4.15, p ¼ .001]. This supports the hypothesis that
patients were less able to form representations that included
information frommultiple dimensions and instead responded
solely on the basis of their strongest dimension.
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The generalisation test probed participants’ ability to apply
their acquired knowledge of the categories to novel stimuli.
Performance on the new stimuli was above chance in both
groups [one-tailed one-sample t-tests: SD patients: t(6) ¼ 1.94,
p ¼ .05; Controls: t(11) ¼ 3.19, p ¼ .009]. We also compared
performance on the generalisation stimuli with performance
in the final block of the learning task, to assess how success-
fully learning transferred to new exemplars. For the purposes
of this comparison, we excluded the six highly prototypical
stimuli from the training set (i.e., the stimuli on the top row
of Fig. 1A that possessed all three typical features for the
category). These stimuli were considerably easier to classify
because they possessed all three typical features. We
excluded them because there were no equivalent stimuli in
the generalisation set: all of the generalisation had at least one
feature associated with the opposing category.
Performance for generalisation trials and equivalent
learning trials is shown in Fig. 5B. A 2  2 ANOVA revealed no
difference between learning and generalisation [F(1,17)¼ 1.79,
p ¼ .2], no effect of group [F(1,17) ¼ .91, p ¼ .4] and no inter-
action [F(1,17) ¼ .59, p ¼ .5]. Based on these findings, it is un-
likely that either patients or controls were memorising the
correct category for individual stimuli. Instead, they attemp-
ted to form more general representations of the characteris-
tics of each category, which allowed them to generalise to new
exemplars.
3.4. Visual discrimination test
The visual discrimination test measured participants’ ability
to perceive the conjunctions of features present in the stimuli
and to discriminate between them. Patients and controls
performed close to ceiling, even for themost demanding trials
(see Fig. 5C). A 3 (condition)  2 (group) mixed ANOVA
comparing patients with controls revealed no main effect of
either group [F(1,11) ¼ 1.65, p ¼ .2] or condition [F(2,22) ¼ .38,
p ¼ .5] and no interaction [F(2,22) ¼ .60, p ¼ .6]. The perfor-
mance of each individual patient was compared with the
control group using the modified t-test (Crawford & Howell,
1998). No patient showed a significant impairment in any of
the conditions (all t < 1.4, p > .1), indicating that their
abnormal performance on the learning task was not due to
difficulty in discriminating visually between the exemplars.4. Discussion
The ATLs are thought to play a central role in the represen-
tation of conceptual knowledge (Lambon Ralph et al., 2010;
Patterson et al., 2007). Here, we investigated how damage to
the ATLs affects acquisition of new concepts. SD patients
completed a category learning task, in which the category
members conformed to a family resemblance structure
designed to replicate the key computational challenges of
acquiring real-world concepts. The patients were able to learn
some information about the stimuli but did so in a sub-
optimal fashion that differed from healthy controls in sys-
tematic and theoretically important ways. For optimalperformance, it was necessary to integrate all three critical
dimensions of the stimuli into a coherent representation.
Patients were unable to do this and instead based all of their
category judgements on a single dimension. This deficit is
consistent with the hub-and-spoke theory of conceptual
knowledge and specifically with the theory that the ATLs act
as a pan-modal representational hub, which integrates a
concept’s disparate sensory-motor and verbal features into a
single coherent representation (Lambon Ralph et al., 2010;
Rogers et al., 2004). With damage to the ATLs, SD patients
largely retained the ability to associate individual stimulus
features with novel categories but were unable to acquire the
integrated feature structure necessary for optimal discrimi-
nation between the two categories.
SD patients also demonstrated over-generalisation of the
successful learning in their preferred dimension: information
from one dimension dominated category decisions, even
when the other features of the stimulus pointed towards an
alternative response. This over-generalisation of remaining
knowledge is also commonwhen SD patients attempt tomake
use of their remaining conceptual knowledge in everyday life
and in clinical assessment (Lambon Ralph & Patterson, 2008;
Lambon Ralph et al., 2010). Over the course of the disease,
patients become increasingly likely to over-extend category
boundaries on the basis of superficial characteristics (e.g.,
accepting a butterfly as a type of bird; Mayberry et al., 2011), to
use a single, highly familiar concept label to refer to a whole
class of items (e.g., all forms of fruit may be called “apples”;
Hodges, Graham, & Patterson, 1995), and to imbue items with
over-generalised, stereotypical attributes in delayed-copy
drawing (e.g., the case of the four-legged duck; Bozeat et al.,
2003; Lambon Ralph & Howard, 2000). In the present study,
we were able to unmask one of the basic mechanisms un-
derpinning this profound deterioration in conceptual repre-
sentation: cerebral atrophy in SD affects integrated
conceptual representations that bind together the various
sources of information that characterise a particular set of
items. Without these coherent concepts, classification and
identification of objects comes to depend on superficial sur-
face characteristics.
Interestingly, another study indicates that SD patients can
successfully make category judgements about novel items
when they are not required to form integrated representa-
tions. Koenig et al. (2006) investigated six SD patients’ ability
to classify novel stimuli based on a category membership rule
and on similarity to a prototype. Koenig et al.’s study differs
from ours in that Koenig et al. explicitly provided patients
with the appropriate rule to apply or prototype to compare
during categorisation. In contrast, we required patients to
learn the relevant category structure themselves through
feedback. Patients in the Koenig et al. study performed simi-
larly to controls and the authors attributed this good perfor-
mance to intact attentional and executive processes. One
possibility for the difference between the two studies is that
the application of explicit rules to determine category mem-
bership depends heavily on executive and attentional pro-
cesses, while the acquisition of multi-dimensional feature
structure is a more automatic process involving implicit
learning mechanisms in temporal regions. This assertion is
supported by an investigation in healthy participants, on
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2001). As in our study, participants were trained to classify
stimuli without being given any explicit instruction regarding
the structure of the category. They were trained with category
structures in which a single feature determined category
membership as well ones that required integration of fea-
tures. Crucially, an executively-demanding concurrent task
slowed learning of the single-feature categories but had little
effect on the categories that required integration. The authors
suggested that learning a single-feature category involved
using executive resources to extract an explicit rule that
governs category membership. In contrast, learning of the
feature-integration categories was assumed to be an implicit
stimulus-driven process (see also Ashby & Ell, 2001). Relating
these findings to our patient group, it appears that while
integration of features was impaired, executively-mediated
rule extraction was intact in most cases, hence their over-
learning of a single feature dimension. However, the two
most severe patients (N.H. and E.T.) were less successful in
acquiring appropriate single-feature information, perhaps
indicating a decline in executive processes as the disease
progresses.
Which regions within the ATLs are critically involved in
acquiring and storing coherent concepts? In SD, atrophy af-
fects the entire ATL region, though it is concentrated in polar
and ventrolateral regions (Gorno-Tempini et al., 2004; Mion
et al., 2010). Converging evidence from other methodologies
has also implicated the ventral and lateral aspects of the ATLs
in the representation of conceptual knowledge (Binney et al.,
2010; Marinkovic et al., 2003; Pobric et al., 2007; Visser &
Lambon Ralph, 2011). A parallel line of work has implicated
medial anterior temporal regions, particularly the perirhinal
cortex, in the perception and learning of novel feature con-
junctions, both in humans (Barense et al., 2005; Taylor, Moss,
Stamatakis, & Tyler, 2006) and non-human primates (Bussey,
Saksida, & Murray, 2002; Murray & Richmond, 2001). Damage
to this region is associated with deficits in discriminating be-
tween novel stimuli based on conjunctions of their features.
Medial and ventrolateral temporal regions also appear to
interact in the acquisition and representation of concepts. For
example, neurons in both the perirhinal and ventrolateral
ATLs change their response characteristics as monkeys learn
novel visual associations, suggesting that both areas are
involved (Messinger, Squire, Zola, & Albright, 2001). It is likely
that medial temporal regions play a critical role in the
perception and initial encoding of new conceptual informa-
tion, while ventrolateral temporal cortex is necessary for
longer-term storage of concepts (Albright, 2012; Squire, Stark,
& Clark, 2004). Established theories of learning hold that this
division of labour is necessary to avoid catastrophic interfer-
ence between similar representations (McClelland,
McNaughton, & O’Reilly, 1995). It is also consistent with the
data observed in this study. SD patients were not generally
amnesic for novel information, as would be expected in pa-
tients with medial temporal lobe dysfunction: they were able
to learn single-feature information andmaintain this between
the two training sessions. Nor were they impaired in percep-
tual discriminationsbasedonconjunctionsof features (though
another study has shown that SD patients can be impaired on
such discriminations for meaningful items; Barense et al.,2010). In contrast, their deficits stemmed from an inability to
extract the underlying patterns of feature co-occurrence pre-
sent over many trials to form representations of the two
stimulus categories. However, a great deal more work is
needed to determine precisely how different sub-regions
within the ATLs work together to process complex feature
conjunctions in a single experience and to integrate informa-
tion acquired over many experiences into coherent concepts.
The striatum and putamen are also involved in learning to
classify stimuli when integration of two dimensions is
required, particularly in the early stages of learning
(Waldschmidt &Ashby, 2011). These subcortical structures are
intact in SD (Mummery et al., 2000) but their interaction with
the damaged temporal cortex has not been investigated.
In this study, we focused on the integration of stimulus
featureswithin thevisualmodality. However, it is important to
note that the ATLs play an important role in integrating con-
ceptual knowledge across modalities: they are equally acti-
vated during conceptual processing of visual and auditory
stimuli, both verbally and non-verbally (Binney et al., 2010;
Spitsyna, Warren, Scott, Turkheimer, & Wise, 2006; Visser &
Lambon Ralph, 2011). In the primate literature, the ATLs have
been associated with associative learning both within the vi-
sualmodality (Albright, 2012;Messinger et al., 2001) and across
different sensorymodalities (Murray&Richmond, 2001; Parker
& Gaffan, 1998). Indeed, the ATLs are strongly connected to
visual, auditory and other sensory cortices (Moran, Mufson, &
Mesulam, 1987; Pandya & Seltzer, 1982), making this region a
key area of polysensory or “transmodal” cortex (Mesulam,
1998; Patterson et al., 2007; Simmons & Barsalou, 2003). The
hub-and-spoke model distinguishes between this transmodal
cortex and spoke regions that are sensitive to structure in a
singlemodality, though this distinctionmay be relative rather
than absolute. Recently, we have proposed that the anterior
temporal region acts as a graded representational space (Plaut,
2002), in which the type of information coded by each area of
cortex is determinedby the inputs it receives fromsensory and
unimodal association cortices (Binney et al., 2012). For
example, the dorsolateral ATL receives strong input from the
posterior superior temporal gyrus, leading this area to exhibit
relative specialisation for information in auditory and verbal
modalities (Visser& LambonRalph, 2011). Ventromedial ATL is
strongly connected with ventral occipitotemporal cortex,
leading to a prominent role in coding visual properties. Criti-
cally, between these extremes lies equi-modal cortex in the
inferior temporal and fusiform gyri that responds similarly
across modalities and presumably codes transmodal struc-
ture. In summary, the process of extractingmeaning from our
experience with objects involves the fusion of complex sets of
information from sensory inputs, motor programmes and
verbal experience. We have demonstrated that one key aspect
of this process, the integration of individual features into
coherent concepts, depends critically on the ATLs.Acknowledgements
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